Introduction
The papers in this special edition are a very small selection from those presented at the EU-NESCA (Network of European Studies Centres in Asia) conference on "the EU and East Asia within an Evolving Global Order: Ideas, Actors and Processes" in November 2008 in Brussels. 1 The conference was the culmination of three years of research activity involving workshops and conferences bringing together scholars from both regions primarily to discuss relations between Europe and Asia, perceptions of Europe in Asia, and the relationship between the European regional project and emerging regional forms in Asia. But although this was the last of the three major conferences organised by the consortium, it in many ways represented a starting point rather than the end; an opportunity to reflect on the conclusions of the first phase of collaboration and point towards new and continuing research agendas for the future.
With the importance of the regional level and inter-regional relations firmly established, key amongst these agendas is now to unpack the Euro-Asian relationship.
On one level, this entails considering what drives policy by considering the interests (and the sources of those interests) that are at the heart of European policy. It also entails going beyond conceptions of a Euro-Asian relationship and instead focussing on multiple sets of relationships conducted by a range of actors driven by different sets of ideas and political objectives. And underpinning both of these tasks of unpacking is the key question of whether European policy (however defined) meets its objectives (and if not, why not)?
Interregionalism and Europe-Asia Relations
The idea that regions can become actors in international relations now has a relatively long history. Not surprisingly, this work focuses on regional organisations in Europe which, notwithstanding the rising significance in studies of other regional projects, and indeed in the concept of "comparative regionalism", remains by far the most studied and debated example of regional integration. 2 As discussed in more detail later, much of this study revolves around the idea of Europe as a different kind of actor in international relations; one that does not act from the "normal" motivations of states, but instead is as Duchêne (1972) argued, a "civilian" (as opposed to military) power promoting liberal norms of rights and democracy in its interactions with other parts of the world; the much debated and oft criticised idea of "normative power Europe" (Manners, 2002) .
Building on this Eurocentric focus, the study of EU as a region that "acts" in international relations has spawned a new literature on how regions interact with each other in the international realm; the concept of "interregionalism" (Soderbaum & Van Langenhove, 2007) . But while the understanding of what the region is in the European cases that acts is easy to identify as the EU (and its predecessors) the same is not true in other parts of the world. To be sure, there are plenty of regional organisations that the EU can interact with, but the membership of these organisations does not always map onto the "region" that Europe wants to interact with. For example, if we think of the EU's attempts to construct a relationship with something called "East Asia", then ASEAN might be considered too small and/or too narrow and APEC too big and/or too broad.
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So when it comes to international relations at the regional level, the first step (quite logically) is to identify the region(s) under consideration. This is not quite as easy as it might sound. As the readership of this journal will fully recognise, identifying what we mean when we refer to Asia or East Asia remains a difficult and contested task.
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In some respects, the promotion of inter-regional dialogue between the EU and Asia has played a role in resolving this dilemma by forcing a decision over who would be part of the Asian side of the meeting (Camroux & Lechervy 1996) . Initially, this understanding of Asia reflecting an emerging understanding of (East) Asia equating to the ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea -the now fairly well established idea of ASEAN Plus Three (APT). 5 But with India, Pakistan and Mongolia joining the Beijing summit in 2008 (alongside the ASEAN secretariat), and Russia and Australia invited to participate in 2010, the Asia that meets the EU in ASEM is becoming increasingly broad, diverse and heterogeneous.
The extent to which ASEM has ever been anything more than a "talking shop" is open to question. 6 But while increasing the number of participants provides a wider basis for taking (and listening), it perhaps even further narrows the opportunities for reaching consensus, and for the EU to promote its interest and attain its objectives.
And perhaps not surprisingly, despite the ongoing ASEM process and the EU's participation in the ASEAN regional forum, much of the formal diplomatic business In particular we wanted to turn our focus to the European side of the relationship and the definitional problems that emerge from understandings of "Europe" as actor in international relations. In particular, we ask if the EU's apparent objectives in interactions with Asia can actually be achieved though EU level interactions.
Europe-Asia Relations: What is Europe?
In the emerging literature on interregionalism, the focus is clearly on the regional institution as actor -hence the use of the idea of EU as interacting with Asia. But of course, the EU is not the only voice, or interest or actor in Europe (however we defined the region). And during the course of reading various academic and policy papers as we defined the topics for the NESCA workshops and conferences, we found that terms like "Europe", "the EU" and "Europeans" were often used interchangeably -even within single pieces of work -reflecting continuing confusion over the nature and location of interests, power, and action.
For example, the investment and trade decisions of firms based in Europe are sometimes used as evidence to show European engagement of Asia in pursuit of the EU's objective of building "strategic partnerships". While the partnership might indeed be facilitated by non-state action (or indeed, non-state interactions might be facilitated by the establishment of partnerships), to think of these sets of relationships as being part of a concerted single unitary effort built around a single "given" interest is somewhat misleading.
So one of the key questions that informed our work was whether this thing called "Europe" has become imbued with too much "actorness" (Hill, 1994) and if other sources of interest and action have become sidelined or compounded into a single unit/level of analysis. In the entirely correct attempt to show that nation states are not the only actors, has the balance has tipped a too far towards the idea of a single
European component of Europe-Asia relations?
From the onset it is important to point out that this is not a political exercise in "euroscepticism" nor an academic exercise of denying the significance of the EU as actor. There is no suggestion that the EU should not play a role, nor any suggestion that it does not play a role. The EU level of analysis is extremely important -partly in terms of what is done collectively at this level, and also partly in the way that EU level legislation plays out at the national level. Moreover, the speed at which the EU has emerged as an actor of whatever sorts in relation to Asia is noteworthy. But as we study the EUs relations with Asia, we need to make sure that we retain a focus on other levels of interest, authority and action within Europe and not simply subsume them into a single process with a single interest.
Through different agencies, the EU has itself done much to fund the study of the EU as an actor in international relations in general, and EU relations with Asia in particular (and perhaps even more particularly, EU relations with China). As recipients of some of this funding, we are very grateful for the opportunities it has provided, and the basis for long term linkages that this NESCA project has forged. If raising a few words of caution sounds ungrateful, it is not -they are words of caution to ourselves as observers and analysts about the sociology of our own endeavours and not to the EU itself.
There has been a considerable expansion of studies of the EU level of interaction in recent years in Asia; indeed it's probably fair to call it an explosion. There is nothing wrong with this in itself and indeed these initiatives should be applauded. The problem lies in the relative lack of attention on other dimensions of European relations and in following the funding we have perhaps collectively unbalanced the analysis by spending too much time on the EU level and not enough on the other dimensions. For example, the funding of EU/European studies in China has resulted in many who previously considered themselves to be country specialists rebranding themselves and refocusing their work on the EU. The study of Europe in China is increasingly becoming EU studies. positions from what we might call the "producers" and the "retailers" -the former those who wanted restrictions to reduce competition and the latter those who pushed for lax or even no restrictions in order to import and sell more Chinese made goods. 15 Notably, during these debates, national governments became strongly associated with "their" dominant industries -Spain, France and in particular Italy with producers seeking limits on imports, and Britain, Germany and the Nordic states associated with retailers and therefore freer trade.
So when it comes to dealing with Asia, the EU as actor is clearly important, but raises questions over which or whose interests are represented by EU policy. We can think of this "who matters" question in different ways. For example, which "sectoral" interests matter and how these interests are articulated and pressed directly at the EU level national level (to influence the EU level). Or which "national" interests matter?
Was Susan Strange (1996: xiv) right when she argued that "international organization is above all a tool of national government, an instrument for the pursuit of national interest by other means"? If so, is EU policy dominated by the interests of the "core"
European economies? Germany, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and the Nordic states?
We should also be aware that in many European countries, local governments are also important commercial actors, either promoting local companies interaction with Asia, or promoting the region as a source of inward investment. Again, these local governments often act in competition with other similar actors -both other European actors, and other national actors. For example, different local development agencies were keen competitors during the Japanese and then South Korean investment booms into Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. 16 Thus, within this commercial relationship we have a "mixity" of European relations with China based on different actors and different sites of authority. 17 We see the importance of the EU level, but also of companies/non state actors, and of governments -both as actors in their own right, and as part of the power constellation at the European level.
So we have already reached a preliminary and perhaps rather straightforward understanding of the nature of the Europe that interacts with Asia. To this we might add two further layers of complexity. First, it is not just different national and/sectoral interests that feed into European policy. There are also differences of opinion and interest at the EU level itself. For example, the parliament and the commission do not always wholly support each other's position. Different DGs also have different positions; for example, officials in at least one DG were dismayed at the dominance of economic considerations in the EUs first official document on relations with China (or more correctly, they were dismayed at how the economic dimensions were being emphasises in the dissemination of the strategy -the written report was considered to be much more balanced).
18
Now this might sound wholly obvious -and indeed it is. But the reason for pointing to this diverse source of interests and actions is because of the way that some have tried to establish an idea of the EU as a "unique" actor in international relations. As
Balducci argues in his paper, the promotion of the idea of the EU as a "norm promoter" -either as Civilian Power Europe or as Normative Power Europe -that does not act like "normal" states can result in the source of policy being overlooked. It can, at an extreme, depoliticise the study of international relations by taking interest and intentions as "given". So even though the understanding of the nature of EU as actor is entirely antithetical to realist conceptions of power maximising rational state elites, the conception of EU as unique actor can result in a similar discounting of the drivers of policy.
The Non-State Sector and Meeting European Objectives
And not all of this action is undertaken by states. We noted above the importance of states (and also the EU) acting on behalf of key business interests in dealing with
Asia. But of course these companies are not simply part of a coherent national (or European) effort. They might seek help where they can get it, and indeed some theorists would argue that when states act, they do so on behalf of powerful domestic corporate/economic interests. Here, then, the state is conceived as agent of economic/class interests and not the other way round -but in some analyses at least, the overseas activity of firms is taken as being part of a wider "national" and/or "European" effort; the firms become agents of national interests; alternatives site of authority and alternative form of inter-regional relationships and governance are still important.
Of course firms are far from the only actors that have an at best ambiguous relationship with the state -and indeed firms are not usually considered to be part of the agenda when it comes to studying Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or inter/transnational civil society interactions. Such non-state interactions are an increasingly important element in Europe-Asia relations; and as Elmaco (2008) argues, in her paper, an increasingly important part of the European goal of democracy promotion. Taking a not-too wide definition of an NGO to include think tanks, foundations and policy institutions as well as more "traditional" development/democratisation promoting groups, then we have a situation where there is often a close relationship between the EU on one hand, and NGOs that study it, lobby it, and/or deliver functions on its behalf on the other. But there are also groups that work outside this network of relationships -some of them on a national scale only -and other still who act in some form of opposition to what they perceived to be the errors or omissions of either their national governments, the EU, or both.
So it is not so much a case of trying to identify NGOs as an extra single layer/dimension of European interaction with Asia, but rather to disaggregate different types of such NGO interaction -some of which appears very much a part of a concerted EU level promotion of "normative power Europe", some of which seems to be occurring in some form of network collaboration, some of which occurs with close relations to national governments and some of which appears to be as independent as perhaps is ever possible for any NGO.
Interpreting a European Interest: Europe as Actor viewed from Asia
The extent to which it is possible to place a national identity non-state activity is of course extremely difficult. This is partly because it's difficult to identify the extent of the linkages between state and non-state as already outlined above, but also because of the transnational nature of much non-state activity. In terms of economic actors and EU relations with Asia, perhaps the classic example is Airbus, which might seem to be the archetypal European transnational company, but which seems to change nationality depending on which political figure is on an overseas trip.
For more traditionally defined NGOs the extent to which they are identified with a nation has also been blurred as many have become BINGOs -Big International NGOs -that operate transnationally. Others are very unhappy to be associated with national governments that they are themselves highly critical of -a sentiment that goes both ways with governments unhappy that the activities of groups that they have no control over sometimes reflects on them. The home country government is sometimes considered to be responsible for what its citizens do, and at times -for example, during the Olympic Torch procession through Europe -there seems to be a conflation of action, identity and interest. The actions of individuals and groups in
France that support Tibetan independence became simply "French", and resulted in a popular campaign to boycott French goods and companies. 21 Now clearly, this association of independent action with a nation and/or a concerted national effort, and/or even government policy is not something that is confined to To repeat, then, the intention here is not to deny the importance of the EU as actor in relations with Asia, but instead to establish six key considerations that provide a framework for studying Europe-Asia relations, and attempt to contextualise understandings of European actorness and interest.
• First, most simply, we need to take care that we know what we really mean (and others infer the same meaning) when we talk of Europe.
• Second, we need to identify different sites of authority within Europe by • Third, we should not conceive of the EU level as constituting a single actor with a single interest, but disaggregate it -for example, what is the role of the different DGs, or the European.
• Fourth, what is the relationship between non-state actors and both the national and EU levels of authority?
• Fifth, we need to consider the way that the actions of "other" European actors either contribute to or undermine the attainment of EU level objectives
• Sixth, and very much related, we should not simply accept the EU interest as "given" but instead go back to basic principles of the study of politics and consider where the interests of EU as actor derive from.
In combination, these considerations not only allow us to develop a more nuanced (albeit more complicated) understanding of the nature of Europe-Asia relations, and
Figure One provides a very rough and simplistic diagrammatic representation of multiple actors and channels of action through which "Europe" interacts with Asia.
And of course, if we were to unpack what we mean by Asia here as well, then the number of actors, the types of connections and the amount of interactions would increase dramatically; thus the idea of "simplified complexity". 
Diverse Actors Diverse Interests
The first collective conclusion relates to the EUs ability to attain its self defined goals.
The answer in part is that it depends on the issue at hand. When it comes to trade where EU member states have willed power to the EU level, then there is indeed considerable "actorness". The same is not the case when it comes to more traditionally defined diplomacy and foreign policy which remain (for the time being at least) still largely the preserve of national governments. And at the risk of further oversimplification, the collective findings suggest that these national interests are largely shaped by the nature of each country's economic engagement with Asia. This is not to say that public opinion is unimportant. In particularly, in those north European countries that have a strong self identity as bastions of democracy and human rights, public opinion plays an important role in shaping policy towards authoritarian regimes in Asia. Companies too seem to be more than aware that being seen to be too close to unpopular regimes can have a detrimental impact at home. But by and large, economics seems to matter most, and be the decisive factor when economic pragmatism and ethical considerations pull in different directions.
Whilst Balducci argues that competing national interests largely shape the nature of conflicts over EU policy (and between EU policy on one hand and national policies on the other), he argues that membership of the EU does have a "socialising" impact on individual member states. For example, he argues that EU membership resulted in Sweden dropping its former critical approach towards China's human rights regime, towards a more "mainstream" pragmatic and business oriented one. Gottwald also suggest that things might be changing -in relation to China at least. When China was conceived of as a great opportunity, then individual countries competed with each other to gain the best possible access for "their" firms. As conceptions of China shifted, and the discourse increasingly became one of China as a "threat", then the tendency towards looking for collective action as a means of providing protection increases.
Of course, it is far too early to know how far the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty might also enhance the EUs ability to develop a stronger and more unified voice. But Ponjaert and Beclard move the analysis "down" from the apex of the EU level to focus on scientific R&D public projects in the shape of the Galileo project with china and the ITER process with Japan. While these reveal the importance of the EU as actor and the development of an EU "footprint" in Asia, they also reveal the "fragmented" and "opportunistic" nature of EU policy, and the multi-layered sets of interests that result in policy, with fundamentally different policies adapted alongside each other.
So our final collective conclusion is that the EU really is an important actor in Europe's relations with Asia, but it is not the only actor. Moreover, accepting the selfidentification of the EU as a civilian power driven by morality and ethical standards in its relations with Asia runs the risk of ignoring the multiple interests, actors and processes that shape the myriad sets of Euro-Asian relations today. Politics is sometimes defined as "the art and science of government". But it is also often defined For good introductory overviews of the evolution of the concept and practice of Europe as actor in international relations, see Smith (2008) and Bretherton and Vogler (2005) .
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On how the EU perceives of and tries to construct this idea of an East Asian region to interact with interregionally, see Gilson (2005) and Doidge (2008) . On what ASEM has actually done, See Gaens (2008). 7 And here ASEM is important in providing a locus for summits with individual Asian countries alongside the multilateral process -as was the case, for example, with the first EU-China summit that directly preceded the ASEM summit in London in 1008.
